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Ending America’s Energy Insecurity:




The homeland/national security threat 
posed by the United States’  dependence on 
foreign oil has  been part of the American 
discourse for years; yet nothing has  been 
done.  No  pragmatic, realistic step-by-step 
plan has  been pursued to end this  scourge on 
the American people.  The solution can be 
found in the  problem.  Net imports  of oil 
account for approximately 50 percent of the 
oil the United States  consumes. Likewise, 50 
percent of oil consumed in the United States 
is consumed as  motor gasoline.  If, overnight, 
the United States  stopped using oil to power 
its unleaded gasoline driven vehicles, if 
overnight drivers  switched to electric 
vehicles,  then overnight the United States 
would become energy independent. Using 
historical data to establish the effect of 
gasoline price changes on consumer vehicle 
choice,  a predictive  model has been created 
showing the expected switch to  electric 
vehicles  if the price of gasoline increases and 
the cost of electric vehicles decreases.  There 
is a cost to energy independence: two to five 
dollars  per gallon of retail gasoline sold.  If 
monies  raised from  the tax are  used to lower 
the price of electric vehicles, build recharge 
infrastructure, and dampen the regressive 
nature of the tax, energy independence is  a 
few short years away.
PROLOGUE
Tomorrow: On  a  beautiful October  morning 
in  North Carolina, you  wake up and turn on 
the news.  Iran  has declared war  on  the west. 
They  have mined the Straight  of Hormuz and 
their  naval  commandos have attacked and 
sunk  multiple oil tankers.  You  sip your  cup of 
morning coffee, watching the world response 
and the talking  heads analyzing  the situation, 
and then  you  head to work.  On your  way  to 
work  you  notice that  every  gas station has a 
line of cars.  Reassuring  yourself that your 
tank  is full,  you  do a  double  take as you  catch 
sight  of the price of gasoline: overnight it  has 
increased by a dollar a gallon.
Three days later  you  cannot  put it  off any 
longer,  you  need gasoline. Your heart sinks as 
you  see the line,  then it sinks even  lower  as 
you  see the price. Gasoline is now  double 
what  it  was four  days ago. Sitting  in  line, 
waiting an  hour  for  your  turn at  the pumps, 
you  listen to the news and hear about the 
combat operations underway  to clear  the 
Straight  of Hormuz and bring  Iran to 
account. The CENTCOM Commander  sounds 
optimistic,  but  he is noticeably  vague about 
when  he expects oil  to flow  freely  again.  As he 
describes all  the bombing sorties and boat 
sweeps for  mines, you  glance at  the line 
creeping  forward and cannot  help but think 
of all the gasoline the military must be using. 
The news turns to the weather  and that 
hurricane that had been  headed to Florida. It 
has taken a  sharp turn  North  and is now 
expected to make landfall in  North  Carolina, 
tomorrow. The governor  speaks and you 
nearly  choke on  your chewing  gum  as he tells 
folks that  they  need to evacuate inland if they 
can, but  not  to count on  finding  gasoline on 
the road. He goes on  to warn that 
communities need to support  each other.  The 
state will  do what  it  can, but  the governor  is 
worried the National  Guard will not have 
enough  gasoline to conduct its usual post-
hurricane rescue and clean  up activities.  You 
think longingly  of the generator  you  bought 
last hurricane season,  and the empty  jerry 
cans you  keep in  the trunk for just  such  an 
emergency.  Just  as it’s your  turn  at  the gas 
pump,  the lights are turned off as the station 
manager announces they are out of gasoline.
While  this sounds like bad science fiction, 
these or  similar  events will happen  at some 
point  in  the future if the United States does 
not shed its dependency on foreign energy.
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INTRODUCTION
This article is focused on  one thing: 
describing the most  plausible,  ready  to 
implement and truly  achievable method of 
enhancing our  national and homeland 
security  by  ending  America’s dependence on 
foreign  oil.  This article provides the tools 
policy  makers can use to bring about  energy 
independence,  it  gives the electric vehicle 
(EV)  and utilities industries an  idea  of the 
opportunities energy  independence would 
provide to them, and it  explains to the 
general  public both  the true nature of the 
threat  posed by  US energy  dependence as 
well as a path for eliminating that threat.
The amount  of oil imported by  the United 
States is roughly  equal  to the amount  of oil 
used in the United States for  motor  gasoline. 
A  shift  to EVs would end our  dependence on 
foreign oil.
Dependence on  foreign  oil threatens US 
national and homeland security.  This threat 
manifests itself in  several ways: it  places 
unhealthy  restraints on  US and allied nations’ 
policy  choices; it weakens the nation 
economically  by  adding  to the trade deficit; it 
forces our  military  to protect  vital oil  trade 
routes; and it  strengthens our  enemies by 
providing  funding  for  their  adversarial 
activities.  
Too often the term  “energy  independence” 
is used as a  proxy  for other  interests, 
misdirecting  the discussion away  from  the 
grave threat  dependence on  foreign  oil poses 
to our  nation’s security. For  example, 
environmentalists appropriate the moniker  of 
security  in  their  efforts to develop renewable 
energies,  though  we cannot  yet harness the 
sun  and wind in sufficient  quantities to end 
our  dependence on foreign  oil.1  The US oil 
lobby  wraps their  persuasion  in  the patriotic 
visage of energy  independence in  their  efforts 
to expand domestic  oil production, though  we 
cannot  drill  our  way  to true energy 
independence.  These movements are topics 
worthy  of their  own  consideration,  but  by 
superficially  attaching  their  agendas to 
America’s energy  insecurity  they  hyper 
politicize what should be an  issue of near 
unanimous agreement: the need to end our 
n a t i o n ’ s e n e r g y  d e p e n d e n c e . T h i s 
politicization  makes a meaningful and 
narrowly  focused discourse on  solving  the 
security  threat  posed by  energy  dependence 
nearly impossible.
For  purposes of this article,  “dependence 
on  foreign  oil”  is the situation where the 
domestic demand for  oil exceeds the available 
domestic supply.  When  the domestic  supply 
is insufficient,  some domestic  consumption 
of oil  must be satisfied by  sources that 
originate in  locations other  than  the states, 
territories,  and possessions of the United 
States.  
The remainder  of this article is organized 
into five sections.  First  is an  examination  of 
the scope and nature of US dependence on 
foreign  oil, including  an  historical look  at 
how  fuel  prices affect  consumer  vehicle 
purchases.  Following that  is an explanation 
of how  those consumer  choices can  be 
influenced and mathematically  predicted by 
changes in  the price of gasoline and the price 
of EVs. The article then describes policy 
c h o i c e s t h a t  w o u l d l e a d t o e n e r g y 
independence. The final  sections discuss 
critical secondary  considerations and offer  an 
a n a l y s i s o f p o t e n t i a l u n i n t e n d e d 
consequences from  the recommended policy 
choices.
THE SCOPE, RAMIFICATIONS, 
AND INTERCONNECTEDNESS OF 
DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN OIL
The 1973/1974  oil  embargo provides 
historical  precedence for  foreign  nations 
using  oil as a  lever  to affect  US national 
policy.2  In 1973/1974, the United States 
imported approximately  28 percent  of the oil 
that  it  consumed. 3 The embargo,  sometimes 
referred to as “Energy  Pearl Harbor  Day,” 4 
was sufficiently  severe to serve as the catalyst 
for  legislative action concerning  the use of 
fuel. Gas shortages were significant enough 
that,  along  with  a  tripling  of world oil  prices, 
gasoline consumption in  the United States 
actually  decreased by  2  percent  in response to 
the embargo.5  The situation was so severe 
that naval oil  reserves were tapped for 
emergency civilian supplies.6
The economic cost of dependence on 
foreign  oil is staggering.  The United States 
has an  oil trade deficit  of approximately 
$1,000,000,000 per  day, larger  than  our 
trade deficit  with  China, 7 which  in 2010 was 
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approximately  $748,000,000 per day. 8  Oil 
consumption  represents 40  percent  of 
America’s energy  needs,  with  20 percent  of 
the oil the United States consumes coming 
from  the Persian  Gulf Region.9  The cost  to 
the United States is compounded. Not only 
do we send one billion  dollars out  of our 
economy  every  day,  but much  of that same 
money  is then  used in a  manner  that directly 
threatens our security. Time and again,  US 
military  and national  security  leaders have 
warned of the substantial risk this outflow  of 
capital poses to the security  of the United 
States. For  example,  Vice Admiral Dennis 
McGinn  has cautioned that the oil trade 
deficit, much of it enriching  nations that  wish 
us harm, is an  unsustainable transfer  of 
wealth  that  has us literally  funding  both  sides 
of the conflict  in the “war  on  terror.” 10 Former 
national security  adviser  Robert McFarlane 
and former  CIA director  R. James Woolsey, 
have recently  described our  dependence on 
foreign  oil  as “the well  from  which  our 
enemies draw  their  political  strength  and 
financial power: the strategic importance of 
oil, which  provides the wherewithal for  a 
generational war against us.” 11 
The restraints oil dependency  places on 
US foreign  policy  decisions are untenable. 
Hugo Chavez, president  of Venezuela, has 
threatened to cut the supply  of oil to the 
United States,  not because of the threat of a 
US invasion, but  as leverage to prevent 
Colombia  from  invading  Venezuela.12 
Similarly, Russia  has shown  it  may  be willing 
to take military  action to control  the supply  of 
oil flowing to the West.  The invasion  of 
Georgia  may  have been  more about the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline  (a  conduit  of oil  to 
the West  owned by  US and British  energy 
firms) than  about support  of the separatists 
in South Ossetia.13 
Similar  threats have come from  non-state 
actors like Osama  bin  Laden and Ayman  al-
Zawahiri, who have called for attacks on 
economic  assets,  especially  energy  sources.14 
In  a  tape aired by  Al-Jazeera in  February 
2006,  Zawahiri said, “I call  on  the 
mujahedeen to concentrate their  attacks on 
Muslims’ stolen  oil,  most  of the revenues of 
which  go to the enemies of Islam  while most 
of what  they  leave is seized by  the thieves 
who rule our  countries.” 15  The non-state 
threats are broader  than just  al Qaeda,  with 
groups specifically  attempting  to wreak havoc 
in international markets.16
These attacks have real consequences, and 
the world oil market recognizes the risk 
posed by  these attacks. In  February  of 2005, 
a  failed al  Qaeda  attack  on  the Aramco facility 
in  Abqaiq,  Saudi Arabia,  caused the price of 
oil on  international  markets to jump nearly 
two dollars per barrel.17
As significant  as those threats are, perhaps 
the single greatest  threat comes from  Iran. 
Iran has expressed its intention privately  and 
publicly,  and possesses the ability  to disrupt 
world oil  supplies should it be attacked. 18 
With  tensions rising  as the United States and 
other nations attempt  to limit  Iran’s nuclear 
program, Iran's navy  chief,  Adm. Habibollah 
Sayyari,  has said that  closing  the Persian  Gulf 
choke point  "is very  easy  for  Iranian naval 
forces." It  was the second such  threat  in  as 
many  days after  Vice President Mohamed 
Reza  Rahimi vowed to close the strait, cutting 
off oil  exports,  if the West imposes sanctions 
on Iran's oil shipments.19 
These are not  idle threats.  If Iran 
retaliated and shut down the Strait of 
Hormuz, it would mean the temporary  loss of 
more than  15  million  barrels of oil a  day. 20 
Iran has built  a  military  arsenal with  this 
capability  in  mind.  There are reports that 
Iran has purchased the SS-N-22  Moskit/
Sunburn  anti-ship missile,  designed to strike 
ships defended with  the Aegis weapon control 
system. 21 Iran  also has a  large supply  of anti-
ship mines, including  modern mines that 
remain stationary  on  the sea floor  and fire  a 
homing  rocket  when a  ship passes overhead. 
In  the deep waters in  the Strait  of Hormuz, 
such  a  weapon could destroy  ships entering 
or  exiting the Persian  Gulf.22  Furthermore, 
Iran’s naval commandos are trained to attack 
shipping  and offshore oil platforms.23  Even 
with  the United States’ extensive military 
power, US intelligence estimates that Iran’s 
military  rearmament  has given  it the ability 
to shut off the flow  of oil  from  the Persian 
G u l f t e m p o r a r i l y . 24  A s s e s s i n g  t h e 
contemporary  threat  from  the tensions over 
Iran’s nuclear  ambitions, General Martin 
Dempsey, chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of 
Staff,  reiterated that  Iran has the capability  to 
close the Strait of Hormuz.25
The looming  Iranian  threat to the oil 
supply  places real restraints on  US security 
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policy  choices. In  considering an  appropriate 
response to Iran’s nuclear  ambitions, US 
administration  officials are wary  of enacting 
sanctions on  Iranian  oil exports. Officials fear 
that  it might  drive up oil  prices when  the US 
and European  economies are weak. As the 
United States and her  allies consider  the 
probable impacts, they  are forced to conclude 
that  in  the end, they  simply  cannot  predict 
what would happen.26 
World oil  supplies continue to be fungible. 
Though  the United States imports much  of its 
foreign  oil  from  friendly  nations like Canada 
and Mexico,27 the entire world supply  would 
be impacted by  a  significant  disruption 
anywhere in  the oil market.28  Should any 
state or  non-state actor  temporarily  interrupt 
the worldwide flow  of oil,  if the United States 
chooses to respond (for example to open the 
Strait of Hormuz),  the government  will  be 
forced to make very  difficult choices. 
“Reserve stores of petroleum  and petroleum-
based fuels would dwindle quickly  – 
particularly  during wartime operations – 
leaving the US military  unable to obtain 
suitable alternative fuels and rendering  it 
virtually  immobile.” 29  Therefore, it  is not 
sufficient  simply  to be dependent  on 
“friendly”  nations for  oil; it  is critical that, 
when  necessary, the United States can fully 
supply  its own  oil needs.  This is discussed 
more fully  below,  in  the consideration  of 
secondary concerns.
There are also less obvious threats to 
homeland security  from  a  reliance on  foreign 
oil. If the military  is demanding  all available 
petroleum  resources, fuel  for  fire, police,  and 
ambulance services will be in  short  supply  in 
the United States. Other,  non-critical, 
demands for  petroleum  would be left 
completely  unfulfilled (e.g.,  commuters, 
truckers, and the air l ine industry) . 
Emergency  services in  the United States are 
delivered via fire trucks, ambulances, and 
police cars; all of those vehicles depend on 
access to gasoline or  diesel fuel;  therefore, 
delivery  of emergency  services in  the United 
States depends on oil.  
On  August  14, 2003, over  9,300  square 
miles, covering  eight states and portions of 
Canada  lost  electrical power  with  virtually  no 
warning. 30  In  New  York  City  alone, 
emergency  services responded to 91,000  911 
calls during the outage.  Even  in  their  reduced 
capacity,  emergency  services were called on 
to perform  more than  thirty  distinct tasks, 
inter  alia: elevator  rescue; subway  rescue; fire 
suppression; hazard calls; traffic accidents; 
welfare checks at  hospitals,  senior  citizen 
homes, day  care centers,  and prisons; 
providing power  to critical  care facilities; 
distributing  water; opening  emergency 
shelters for the elderly; and helping the 
elderly  up and down stairs. The firefighters 
were able to perform  these actions because 
they  had fuel  in their  vehicles and because 
most of their  911  dispatch  centers and many 
fire stations had emergency power. 31 
When Hurricanes Rita  and Katrina  made 
landfall oil  and gasoline production  was 
virtually  halted as production  facilities were 
evacuated and wells were closed. By 
September  1, at least  one county  in  North 
Carolina  was faced with  60  percent  of its gas 
stations out  of fuel.32 Had the fuel  shortages 
persisted or  worsened, North  Carolina would 
have been  unable to provide the National 
Guard (which  obtains its fuel through  the 
state) with  fuel for  very  long.  The shortage 
occurred hundreds of miles from  the storm. 
North  Carolina  was fortunate  that  it  did not 
need to rely  on  the services of its National 
Guard during this crisis.  
Imagine what might happen  if an 
intentional  disruption  of the oil supply 
coincided with  a  widespread power outage or 
natural disaster. Imagine the National  Guard, 
fire services, EMS, and law  enforcement 
becoming essentially incapacitated.
US OIL IMPORTS AND OIL USES
The United States is the third largest 
producer  of oil  in  the world. 33 For  2009, EIA 
data  shows that the United States had net 
imports of 9.7  million barrels of crude oil  per 
day.34  The 9.7  million  barrels of crude oil 
imported per  day  was from  a total  of 18.7 
million barrels of crude oil used per  day.35 
During  the same year,  13.3  million  barrels of 
oil were used per  day  for  transportation 
purposes in  the United States,  with  nine 
million barrels per  day  specifically  used for 
motor gasoline. 36  The nine million  barrels 
used every  day  for  motor  gaso l ine 
represented 48  percent of all  US petroleum 
consumption.37  The relative numbers have 
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held fairly  constant.  In  2010,  the United 
States consumed 19.1  million  barrels of oil 
per  day, 38 with nine million barrels per  day 
used for  motor  gasoline.39  In  2010, net 
imports accounted for 49  percent of US oil 
consumption.40 Figure 1  below  describes the 
uses of oil in greater detail.
Importantly, very  little of the oil 
c o n s u m e d i n  t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s 
(approximately  1.11  percent in  2009)  is used 
for  electricity  production.41 That  means that 
adding  nuclear  or  clean  coal facilities, 
building  wind farms,  installing  solar  panel 
fields, etc., do little to foster energy 
independence.  Those technologies do not 
replace oil combustion  in  a  manner  that  can 
currently  be utilized by  most  of the 
transportation sector. 
By  focusing  on  the single greatest  use of 
oil – the nine million  barrels that are used as 
motor gasoline every  day  – the solution 
emerges from  the problem  itself. Figure 2 
below  graphically  illustrates the problem  and 
in so doing, the genesis for  a  solution 
emerges. 
Figure 1. Uses of Oil 42
1 Liquefied petroleum gases.
2 Asphalt  and road oil, aviation gasoline, kerosene, lubricants, naphtha-type jet fuel,  pentanes plus, petrochemical 
feedstocks, special naphthas, still gas (refinery gas), waxes, miscellaneous products, and crude oil burned as fuel.
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Figure 2. Oil  Imports, Consumption and Amounts 
Used for Motor Gasoline43 
If the United States  stopped using 
gasoline to  power its  automobiles,  it would 
essentially become energy independent 
overnight.  While it  may  not  be possible to 
transform  literally  overnight, it  is possible  to 
transition to EVs in  a  few  short  years, cease 
using  motor  gasoline, and thereby  become 
energy  independent in  a  few  short  years. 
Although  the move to EVs is likely  to occur 
slowly  in  response to market  forces alone,44 
given  the urgency  of the security  threat  posed 
by  dependence on foreign  oil,  market  forces 
need to be stimulated to rapidly  bring  about 
the change.
CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE 
ADOPTION OF AN EV FLEET 
Electric vehicle technology  has advanced to 
the point  of providing  a driving experience in 
both  range and performance that  is 
comparable to that  provided by  internal 
combustion passenger  vehicles. The high 
performance Tesla  Roadster  sports car  is 
quite  literally  where the rubber  meets the 
road. It  is an  EV  capable of traveling 300 
miles on a  single charge.45  The primary 
difficulty  in  providing  mainstream  vehicles of 
similar  performance capability  is the cost  of 
EV  batteries.  Fortunately,  EV  battery  prices 
are falling  and falling  quickly.  One prediction 
is that  a  battery  capable of powering a  vehicle 
100 miles,  which  cost  $33,000 in  2011, will 
cost just $16,000 by the end of 2013.46
Analysis of historical  fluctuations in 
gasoline prices demonstrates that with long-
term  price increases in  the cost  of gasoline, 
people will  reduce their  consumption  of 
gasoline,  at least  partially, by  moving  to more 
fuel-efficient vehicles.47  However, speeding 
up EV  adoption  depends on several factors, 
including: improving  battery  efficiencies and 
capacities to increase range; bringing  the 
total cost  of EV  ownership in  line with  or 
below  the total cost  of gasoline powered 
vehicles; and increasing  the pace of EV 
infrastructure development  (e.g., recharge/
refuel facilities). 48
GASOLINE PRICE AND VEHICLE CHOICE
Around the turn  of the millennium,  carbon 
tax and other  policy  discussions about global 
warming  brought  the question  of gasoline 
elasticity  into sharp focus. Rather  than look 
just at  traditional measures of elasticity, the 
literature evolved in  an effort  to account for 
income disparities, miles driven  and, 
ultimately, vehicle choice. Gasoline demand 
and the demand for  automobiles were 
modeled as a  joint  decision.  By  also 
accounting  for  income,  it emerged that there 
was not a uniform  elasticity  measure,  but 
rather  elasticity  varied across the income 
distribution. 49  Importantly, it  was also 
determined that  gasoline demand responds 
to changes in  the price of gasoline in  large 
part by  modifying  the fuel  efficiency  of the 
car  fleet  rather  than  through an  adjustment 
of miles traveled.50  An  historic review, 
looking  at  the  period from  2003  through 
2007, determined that  the 100 percent 
increase in  gasoline prices over that  time had 
induced motorists to adjust  the types of 
vehicles they  purchased.51  One study 
determined that if gasoline price increases by 
10 percent, the demand for  SUVs will 
decrease by  13.7  percent  and the demand for 
hybrid cars will increase by  9.1  percent. 52 The 
report  specifically  notes the potential policy 
advantages that  tax  increases on  the price of 
gasoline have over  increasing  the federal 
corporate average fuel  economy  (CAFE) 
standards. That  advantage stems from  more 
direct alignment with market forces.53  
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A PREDICTIVE MODEL
Recognizing  that  changes in  the price of 
gasoline will result  in  changes in  the vehicles 
consumers purchase,  a  logical progression  is 
to examine the possibility  of predicting  the 
extent of that  change in  purchasing  behavior. 
In  order to provide a  rigorous basis for 
federal  policies that  would accelerate the 
nation’s transition  from  gasoline internal 
combustion  engines to a  national fleet of EVs, 
it  would be useful to develop a  model to 
predict the effect  various policy  choices 
would have on EV  adoption.  The model 
developed here examines the basic costs of 
vehicle ownership as well as the more 
complex  factors of vehicle choice.  The 
methodology  provides a  model  that should be 
reasonably  accurate at lower  volumes of 
sales, recognizing that given  the overall 
complexities of the system, it  cannot  predict 
precise sales numbers.  The model will also 
create a  general methodology  where any 
practitioner  can  incorporate additional 
factors, or  utilize different assumptions,  and 
have a  grounded basis to predict  the results 
flowing from those choices.
The model development  is described in 
detail in  Appendix  1.  It  relied on  the 
theoretical  framework developed by  Jeihani 
and Sibdari. 54 Though they  chose to calculate 
the relative probability  of choosing one car 
over  another, the model developed here 
solves for  sales volume of a  particular  vehicle 
class. In all,  three vehicle classes are included 
in  the analysis: SUV,  hybrid,  and EV.  Though 
the relationships established by  hybrid data 
serve as reasonable proxies for  EVs,  because 
the influencing  factors are somewhat 
different (e.g., the price of electricity  can  be 
expected to effect EV  purchasing  more than 
hybrids),  EVs require their  own equation. 
Historical data on  both  SUV  and hybrid 
vehicle  sales is used to determine coefficients 
whereby  the mathematical equation  most 
closely  aligns with  a  graph  of actual  historical 
car purchase data.
The coefficients that multiply  other terms 
are proportionality  factors.  That  is,  they 
measure the direction  and strength of the 
effect  of the term  they  multiply.  By  way  of 
example,  in  Equation  1  below, the coefficient 
B multiplies household income. A  change in 
household income is expected to cause a 
change in  sales of a  particular  class of 
vehicles,  but  whether  it causes more sales or 
less sales, and how  much  more or  less,  is 
captured by  the coefficient  B. There is one 
stand-alone coefficient. It  is a  catchall. There 
are certainly  factors that  influence the 
purchase of vehicles that are not  included as 
factors contained in the equation. For 
example,  an  advertising campaign  may 
impact  vehicle sales but is not  one of the 
factors analyzed using  historical  data.  Some 
factors effecting sales could be determined 
while others are probably  unknowable.  The 
models in  this article use the factors 
identified as relevant by Jeihani and Sibdari.
Where specific vehicle averages are 
necessary  (for  example, average sales price of 
the class of vehicle)  a  representative vehicle 
was chosen. The Ford Explorer  represents the 
SUV class of vehicles, and the Toyota Prius 
represents the hybrid class of vehicles.  The 
SUV was modeled to test the framework 
against a  more traditional  class of vehicles, 
one whose sales likely  have a  stronger 
correlation  to the price of gasoline than  other 
vehicle classes.
There is insufficient data  for  a  meaningful 
historical analysis of EV  sales, due to the low 
number  of EV  sales. Until  sales are robust 
enough  that it  appears the modeling  factors 
are measurably  impacting  total EV  sales, a 
meaningful historical  sales analysis,  using the 
factors contained in  this article,  cannot be 
accomplished.  Therefore,  the coefficients 
derived for  hybrid vehicles are used as a 
proxy  in  predicting EV sales,  assuming  the 
two are closely  related.  Those coefficients are 
then  used in  the model to predict  future sales 
of EVs.  Appendix 1  describes in  detail  how 
the formulas were derived.  The equation for 
hybrid vehicle sales is:
 (1)
The equation representing  the sales 
figures of SUV vehicle sales is:
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 (2)
The coefficients derived for the hybrid 
vehicle  will be used as proxies for  the EV 
sales volume model. It  is reasonable to 
presume that factors influencing  people’s 
decision  to purchase hybrid vehicles will 
similarly  influence their  decision  to purchase 
EVs. As with  hybrids,  it is likely  that the first 
consumers to purchase EVs do so for  a 
myriad of concerns and motivations (e.g., 
environmental, status). As sales of hybrids 
grew,  economic forces such  as declining 
vehicle  price and increase in  gasoline price 
likely  have become the dominant market 
drivers. The same is presumed to be true with 
EVs. Therefore, only  one parameter  from  the 
hybrid model,  Equation 1,  was replaced. 
CPMhy was replaced with  PMEV, which  was 
derived using  the representative cost  of 
electricity  per  kWhr and the number  of miles 
driven  by  the EV  per kWhr. Accordingly, the 
model describing  the sales volume of electric 
vehicles is represented by:
 (3)
• Ahy = all  consumer  preferences and 
choice factors not  specifically  addressed 
elsewhere in the equation,
• SEV = the sales volume of electric 
vehicles, 
• Bhy = weight factor  for  societal annual 
income, 
• I = societal average annual income,
• Chy = weight factor for unemployment,
• U = total unemployment, 
• Dhy = cost of locomotion factor,
• PMEV = price per mile for locomotion,
• Ehy = weight factor for price of hybrid,
• PEV = price of hybrid vehicle
Appendix 2  contains the historic data  used 
to derive the constants,  encompassing  the 
years 1991  to 2010 for  SUVs and 2000–2010 
for  hybrids, as well  as a  description  of the 
process used to determine the coefficients. 
The resulting  coefficients are contained in 
Table 1.
Note that  Dhy,  which represents the 
response of the hybrid vehicle sales figures to 
gas prices,  is positive whereas DSUV is 
negative.  This is intuitively  plausible and 
represents the expected fact  that  higher  gas 
prices provide an incentive for the purchase 
of hybrid or  electric vehicles whereas they 
provide a  disincentive to the purchase (or 
ownership) of SUVs.  At  it  most  elemental, 
this is the  basis for  the government  policy 
proposed below.
APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO 
FORECAST SALES
At this point, the equations have been  derived 
and the coefficients describing  the direction 
and strength  each factor  has on  the sales of a 
class of vehicles has been determined from 
fitting  a  mathematical curve to a  graph  of 
historical sales.  Using  the relationships 
captured by  those coefficients,  the models 
can  now  be applied to predict  future sales by 
estimating  the future value of the causal 
factors described in  the equations (e.g., 
expectations of the future price of gasoline 
and of the future cost of the various classes of 
vehicles).  It  is therefore necessary  to project 
the data  into the future.  Various government 
policy  choices,  (e.g.,  the gasoline excise tax 
per  gallon  and the rebate to the buyers of 
EVs) are parameters that can  be adjusted by 
the user  to achieve a  desired result affecting 
the consumption  of gasoline and the 
purchase of vehicle types.  
Table 1. Coefficients of the Sales Volume Models (Equations 1 and 2) of Hybrid and SUV Vehicles as 
Derived by Fitting The Equations to Historical Sales Data (Appendix 2)
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A B C D E
Hybrid/electric 3.6 2.16*10–4 -1*10–13 31.1 -1.66*10–4
SUV 13.36 2.01*10–4 -1.4*10–7 -10.8 -1.97*10–4
Although  the model was tested using  a 
wide variety  of parameters,  those chosen 
were ultimately  selected because they  seemed 
to represent a  good balance of the positive 
and negative effects of available policy 
choices and conservative assumptions about 
future economic conditions. The assumptions 
applied to the predictive model (Equation  3) 
to produce the predictive result  can  be found 
in Appendix 3.
Applying the policy  (most  notably  a 
gasoline excise tax  starting  at  $2  and rising  to 
$5  per  gallon  of gasoline, and an  EV  purchase 
r e b a t e o f $ 1 5 , 0 0 0 ) a n d e c o n o m i c 
assumptions to Equation 3,  provides the 
following  projections of EV  sales between 
2011 and 2018 (Figure 3).   
Figure 3  shows that  EV  sales will begin 
rising rapidly  in  a  “hockey  stick”  manner 
once the policies choices listed above are 
introduced in  2012. A  substantially  higher 
gasoline price as well as a  rebate of $15,000 
to each  EV  buyer is expected to induce this 
“hockey  stick”  effect. The rebate is funded 
entirely  from  the revenue generated by  the 
gasoline excise tax. (Note: policies that  will 
lessen the regressive nature of this tax  are 
discussed below.)
Table 2  shows the annual  excise taxes 
predicted to be collected each  year  through 
2018,  the amounts to be distributed as 
rebates for  EV  purchases, and the remaining 
sums to be used to implement  other  EV 
adoption  policies (e.g.,  refunds to low-income 
families and recharge infrastructure build out 
incentives).   Note that  until 2017, the 
incentive rebates represent  less than  25 
percent of the collected tax.
Figure 3. Predicted EV Sales for the Period 2011-2018 in Response to Taxation and Subsidy Policies as 
Projected by the Model
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Table 1. Excise Tax Collected
Year Total Gasoline Excise Tax 
Collected
Tax Used For EV 
Rebates
Gas Tax Net of EV 
Rebate
2012  $34,534,635,600  $3,982,118,284  $30,552,517,316 
2013  $68,548,941,078  $5,438,617,192  $63,110,323,885 
2014  $84,797,868,872  $7,405,192,521  $77,392,676,352 
2015  $83,588,354,094  $10,054,056,083  $73,534,298,011 
2016  $81,946,191,600  $13,613,986,738  $68,332,204,863 
2017  $79,722,573,766  $18,388,609,526  $61,333,964,241 
2018  $76,719,100,877  $24,780,556,145  $51,938,544,732 
Any  effort  at  predicting  future behavior  is 
a  risky  proposition. The mathematical 
equation used here is no different.  Due to the 
dearth of data  relating  to EV  sales, it was 
necessary  to presume that the hybrid 
coefficients will translate to the EV  model,  it 
fails to reflect  the bounded nature of the 
vehicle  market,  and it presumes that  past 
linear  relationships will  be maintained into 
the future.  All this is to say,  the model is not 
intended to be provide an  actual,  exact 
number  of EVs that  will be purchased.  The 
numbers themselves are less important than 
the trends, the general magnitude of the 
results,  and the relationship of the factors to 
each  other. Graphically, it  is the bend in  the 
hockey  stick of Figure 3  that is important. 
The bend represents the rapid change that 
can  be brought  about  if the policy  levers 
discussed are utilized appropriately.
POLICY CHOICES
SUGGESTED COURSE OF ACTION
The modeling  results demonstrate that  it  is 
possible to alter  consumer  behavior 
significantly  in  favor  of EV  purchases by 
using  an  excise tax to raise the price of 
gasoline and using  those funds in  part to 
bring down the cost of EVs. Each  step in 
lowering  the use of gasoline by  automobiles is 
a  step towards energy  independence and 
greater  national and homeland security. 
Therefore, in  a program  announced 
significantly  ahead of time, the federal 
government  should implement an  excise tax 
on  retail  gasoline purchases. In  order  for 
elasticity  to strengthen, consumers must  have 
substitutes that are easy  to switch  to.  That is, 
if there are not  readily  available alternative 
choices to driving  a  vehicle that  uses gasoline, 
consumers will not be able to change their  car 
purchase choices even  if gasoline is extremely 
expensive.  Therefore,  a  portion  of the funds 
raised by  the excise tax should go directly 
towards a tax  credit  or  point  of purchase 
credit for  the purchase of EVs. The additional 
funds raised should be used to offset the 
effect  of the tax  on  the lowest  income 
segment in the population.  That concern  is 
addressed in  more detail below. Additionally, 
it  is important to use those funds as incentive 
to propel the creation  of a  recharging 
infrastructure in  the United States. The 
ultimate goal is an all EV  automobile market 
and the end of motor  gasoline powered 
vehicles,  without diminishment  of the US 
driving experience, and without a  switch  to 
vehicles powered by  other  forms of oil  (e.g., 
diesel). As stated previously, tax  increases on 
the price of gasoline create a more direct 
alignment  with  market  forces (as compared 
with  CAFE standard increases).55  The policy 
choices described herein  accelerate market 
forces, but  in  the end, it  is a  policy  reliant  on 
market  forces to drive the change to EVs. It  is 
not recommended that  government  mandate 
that  only  EVs are  sold,  rather  that with 
appropriate and limited pressure, the market 
will determine which  and what type of 
vehicles are available for sale.
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EXCISE TAX ON RETAIL GASOLINE 
PURCHASES
A  tax on  the sale of retail gasoline should be 
implemented.  As was demonstrated by  the 
model, an  excise  tax  of between  two and five 
dollars raises more funds than  is required for 
rebates, even  where the rebate is $15,000, 
double the historical rebate on  new  EV 
purchases.  In  order to allow  consumers to 
prepare for  the economic consequences of the 
excise tax, and with  the goal of seeing change 
at  the beginning of implementation,  it is 
important that the policy  be announced 
ahead of time.  It  takes one to two years of 
gasoline price increases before there are real 
shifts in purchase behaviors. 56  
Phasing  in  the tax serves two purposes. 
First,  though  announcing  the increase ahead 
of time should allow  for  a  more immediate 
response to the price increases,  there are 
inevitably  consumers who cannot or  will not 
react immediately.  A  phase-in allows some of 
those consumers to adjust  before the full  tax 
is in  place.  Additionally,  a  phase-in  would 
allow  any  unanticipated consequences to 
occur  in  a  more controlled manner, 
diminishing  their  magnitude and allowing 
more time to respond appropriately.
Eventually,  economies of scale should 
bring down  the price of EVs so that  they  are 
sufficiently  competitive without  government 
rebates. According to the DOE, just  the 
creation of battery  manufacturing plants, 
spurred by  Recovery  Act matching  funds,  is 
lowering  battery  prices through  economies of 
scale. 57 As demand increases and production 
rises to meet the demand, prices should fall 
allowing  market forces to drive the price 
reductions.
RECHARGE INFRASTRUCTURE
If EVs are to be adopted nationwide,  a  well-
designed and widely  distributed network  of 
charging  stations is imperative.58 A  portion of 
the funds collected by  the excise tax  net  of EV 
rebates should be used to assist  in  the 
creation of this infrastructure. The fourth 
column  of Table 2  illustrates the additional 
monies that  will be available to policymakers. 
A  portion  of those funds will also be required 
to offset  the economic hardship the gasoline 
tax may  create for  low-income families. That 
issue is discussed in more detail below.  
Range anxiety, a  term  described by 
Bostford and Szczepanek, 59 is a  phenomenon 
not  present  with  hybrid vehicles and, 
therefore,  not  captured by  the coefficients 
developed from  hybrid vehicle historical data. 
Range anxiety  is particularly  troublesome 
because it  is more than  a  reflection  of the 
ability  of a  driver  to go from  point A  to point 
B. It reflects that  a driver  may  choose not  to 
try  to go from  point A  to point  B even  when 
the EV is fully  capable of traveling  that 
distance. Bostford and Szczepanek describe 
range anxiety  using an  anecdote from  the 
Tokyo Electric Power  Company  (TEPCO).  In 
2007,  TEPCO introduced electric  service 
vehicles and tracked employee usage of the 
vehicles over  an  8 x  15  km  service area. 
Initially, overnight  charging  was the only 
option.  A  few  months into the program  they 
realized that  EV  drivers were only  covering  a 
small portion  of the service area. TEPCO 
responded by  adding  a  fast charge station 
that  could be used any  time of the day. After 
its installation,  EV  drivers accessed the 
service area in  a  similar  manner  to 
c o n v e n t i o n a l v e h i c l e d r i v e r s .  M o s t 
interestingly, the fast  charger  was rarely 
used. 60 The point is that  the fast charger  was 
not necessary  to meet  the actual  needs of the 
E V ,  i t w a s n e c e s s a r y  t o m e e t  t h e 
psychological needs of the EV drivers.  It was 
necessary  to counter  range anxiety.  If range 
anxiety  is not addressed, it  may  have a 
significant deleterious effect  on  the accuracy 
of the EV model.  
There are various types of recharge 
facilities.  The cost  of the slow  charge facilities 
is significantly  cheaper than  for  fast  charge. 
In  fact,  some EVs can  slow  charge without 
any  change to a  standard electrical  outlet.61 
As shown  in  Figure 4, as the speed of the 
charge goes up, so does the required voltage/
amperage output,  which  necessitates more 
expensive facilities. 
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Typical	 set	 of	 charging	 options	 developed	 for	 an	 EV.
EVSE Utility Service Usage Charge Power 
(kW)
Time to Charge
Level 1 110 V, 15 A Opportunity 1.4 18 hours
Level 2 220 V, 15 A Home 3.3 8 hours
Level 2 220 V, 30 A Home/Public 6.6 4 hours
Level 3 480 V, 167 A Public/Private 50-70 20-50 min
Figure 4. Recharge Levels and Time to Charge62
One estimate of the cost  of recharging 
stations can  be taken from  a  project 
underway  in  Portland, Oregon.63  Oregon  is 
using  a  two million  dollar  federal grant 
(stimulus money)  to build  forty-two “quick 
charge”  stations along  the I-5  corridor, 
ensuring  no gap greater  than fifty  miles.  That 
averages out  to $47,619  federal  dollars per 
station.  These stations are designed to charge 
an  EV  battery  to 80  percent  capacity  in a 
twenty to thirty minute period. 64
A  project  funded in  part by  the US 
Department of Energy  (DOE) provides an 
estimate for  the cost of building  slow  charge 
stations. Given  the total cost  of $230 million 
(of federal  money) to build 15,000  charging 
stations, each  station  costs approximately 
$15,333; however,  that also includes 310 
quick  charging stations,65  which  are more 
expensive.  Assuming  the quick charging 
stations cost $47,619  each,  the cost per 
station  of the ordinary  charging  stations 
would be approximately  $14,652  federal 
dollars. 
Fortunately,  recent  stimulus funds have 
established the efficacy  of dollar-for-dollar 
g r a n t s i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g a  r e c h a r g e 
infrastructure.  As described previously, with 
two million  dollars of stimulus funds Oregon 
has created a recharge infrastructure 
covering  all  of Interstate 5  that runs through 
the state.  It is not expected that funds will be 
required to incentivize all recharge stations. 
As EV  sales increase,  market  forces may  lead 
to the development  of the infrastructure as 
well.  Already  some retail establishments have 
determined that  it  is in  their  interest to put  in 
recharge parking spaces. 66   Nevertheless, 
especially  given  the concerns of range 
anxiety, to truly  jump start US energy 
independence,  significant investment should 
be put  into creating  a  recharge infrastructure, 
fully funded by the retail gasoline excise tax.
NEW POWER STATIONS AND 
INFRASTRUCTURE
EVs use far  more energy  than  may  be 
obvious.  Adding  an  EV to a  neighborhood 
will increase the demand for  electricity  to the 
same or  greater  extent  of adding a  new  house 
to the neighborhood. For  example, the Tesla 
Roadster  contains a  56  kWh  battery. 67  By 
comparison,  consumption by  residential 
utility  customers averaged 908 kWh  per 
month,68  meaning  that the  average house 
uses about  30 kWh per  day  versus the 56 
kWh  per  day  if a  person  fully  drained the 
Tesla  Roadster  battery  each  day.  The energy 
currently  provided by  gasoline will  have to 
come from  power  stations. This means the 
United States will  need not only  additional 
stations but  also additional transmission 
infrastructure,  as the current infrastructure is 
not sufficient.69
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Fortunately,  power  companies are largely 
financially  successful. 70  If the regulatory 
obstacles are diminished,  private industry 
should take over  the building  of generation 
and transmission capabilities to meet  the 
demand created by  EVs;71  however,  it  takes 
time to build power stations and the 
transmission  infrastructure to support it. If 
the regulatory  obstacles are removed,  and the 
government’s plan to encourage EV  adoption 
is transparent, unambiguous,  communicated, 
and publicized one to two years before it  goes 
into effect, that will  allow  market forces to 
begin responding  so they  are prepared to 




Will the US citizenry  accept  a  substantial  tax 
on  the sale of gasoline? There is a  historical 
basis to believe they  might, if citizens accept 
the security  implications that  are alleviated 
by  the tax.  A  parallel  can  be drawn  to 
economic  events during  and after  WWII. 
Between  the purchase of government war 
bonds,  and the substantial federal  income tax 
paid by  Americans, federal  revenues were 
raised to never  before seen  amounts, “$98.3 
billion  by  1945,  nearly  half the war-swollen 
GDP.” 72  Although  the government’s 
propaganda  campaign  centered on  the ethical 
imperative  to counter  the Axis tyranny, 
combined with  the self-interest  realized by 
investing  in  war  bonds,  research  has shown 
that  the government  missed the mark. The 
real reason  citizens accepted the fiscal 
hardship was not  for  abstract  ideals; rather  it 
was the chance to help someone they  could 
identify  with.  The idealized all-American  GI, 
the boy  next door,  was who they  were 
helping. By  paying  taxes and buying bonds, 
people saw  themselves putting a  gun  and 
bullets directly  in  the hands of a  GI. This 
allowed for  a  sort  of indirect participation in 
the war itself. 73
A  similar view  of the same social/
psychological phenomena has been referred 
to as the post-tragedy  opportunity  bubble. 74 
Breckenridge and Moghaddam  look  at  the 
psychological similarities between  the attacks 
of 9/11  and the attack on Pearl  Harbor.  They 
describe the fleeting  moment of opportunity 
where the populace rallies around its leaders, 
trusts them  more, and, because they  are 
looking  for  a specific way  to help,  can  be 
directed in a manner not usually possible.  
In  the first State of the Union  Address 
after  9/11,  President  Bush  called on 
Americans to give at  least  two years over  the 
course  of their  lifetimes to the service of their 
neighbors and nation.75  Unfortunately,  that 
message did not  resonate with  Americans in  a 
way  likely  to make them  feel  like part  of the 
fight  against those who attacked us. The 
success of fiscal participation  during WWII 
turned on  personalizing the response, 
allowing  the citizenry  to feel it  was truly 
participating  in  defeating the great evil. The 
urgent desire to participate was given  outlet 
in  a  contemporaneous ability  to aid in  the 
defeat  of the enemy. The outlet  was 
immediate and direct, not an ephemeral and 
vague channeling  of that desire to some 
general  purpose,  at  some undetermined time 
in the future.  
In reviewing  the post 9/11  response, 
Breckenridge and Moghaddam  show  that the 
government’s failure to provide meaningful 
participation resulted in a  failure to capture 
the public’s long-term  engagement and 
support.  There was no mechanism  for  the 
citizenry  to help defeat  the great  evil. 
Furthermore,  the opportunity  to harness the 
public sentiment is fleeting.   Once the bubble 
pops, the opportunity is essentially lost. 76
Taken  together,  these examples show  an 
uphill,  though  not  impossible,  task of moving 
the citizenry  of the United States to accept 
the sacrifice of a  significant tax on  gasoline. A 
simple and straightforward message needs to 
make the case that there is an  ongoing  and 
real evil threatening the nation,  caused by 
dependence on foreign oil.  In  countering  this 
threat, the link  must  be clear  in  the minds of 
the citizenry: money  spent at  the pump (in 
the form  of an  additional  tax) is buying back 
the very  guns and bombs that are killing 
Americans.  Secondly,  a  personal  and clear 
image must  be established between  the 
money  paid and the lives saved. While paying 
the tax  may  not  put a  gun  in the hands of a 
GI, it can  be shown  to take a  gun  out of the 
hands of the enemy. No more traumatic  head 
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injuries,  no more amputees, no more 
sophisticated plots to attack America.
Currently  the country  may  not  be ready  to 
view  the threat of dependence on  foreign oil 
in  the same concrete terms as the bombing of 
Pearl Harbor  or  the events of 9/11.  If that  is 
the case,  the government  should nonetheless 
begin  building the framework described 
herein. With  so many  enemies funded by  oil 
sales,  it  is unfortunately  only  a  matter of time 
before another  tragic  event  disrupts the 
landscape of the United States. When that 
happens, leadership should be ready  to ask 
for  the participation  of the citizenry,  to ask 
for  their  shared sacrifice as a  direct  and 
meaningful way  to participate in defeating 
those who seek to do us harm.
PUBLIC SUPPORT POLITICALLY
By  using  EVs as the mechanism  to end energy 
dependence, this paper  promotes a solution 
that both  the political  right (ending 
dependence on  foreign  oil) and the political 
left  (environmental  benefits of EVs) have 
vocally  supported in  the past.  Though  this 
article is solely  focused on  the detrimental 
effects energy  dependence has on US 
security, proposing a  solution  that is 
agreeable to both  sides of the political 
spectrum  should ease adoption  by  the 
political system  that  must choose whether  or 
not and how to implement the plan.
SOURCE OF ENERGY STORAGE 
MATERIALS
The current  technology  of choice for 
powering  EVs is the lithium  ion  battery.77 
There are several problems with  reliance on 
lithium  for  energy  storage. First,  there is 
d i s a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  j u s t h o w  m u c h 
economically  available lithium  there is in  the 
world,  with  some experts saying  supplies are 
quite  limited,78  and others saying there are 
ample supplies available.79  More troubling 
for  national  and homeland security  is the 
location  of the largest known  deposits of 
lithium.  They  are not in  the United States. 
The Andes Mountains in  South  America, 
specifically  the  area  where the borders of 
Chile, Bolivia, and Argentina  meet, contain  a 
large majority  of the world’s usable lithium,80 
with  Bolivia  containing  the largest  known 
deposits in  the world.81 Recent  discoveries in 
Afghanistan suggest  that  it  too may  possess 
significant deposits of lithium. Additionally, 
current battery  technology  relies on  magnets 
of a  type that  depends on  rare earth  metals 
like neodymium,  95  percent of which  are 
produced in China. 82
It defeats the goal of energy  independence 
if the United States simply  trades one energy 
dependency  for  another.  “We know  that 
Bolivia  can become the Saudi Arabia  of 
Lithium.” 83 Policymakers must  be mindful of 
this potential development,  but  it is still 
preferable to dependence on  vehicles that 
derive locomotion  through  oil, and there are 
reasons to believe it  is avoidable.  In  the first 
instance,  unlike reliance on oil (where the 
resource is consumed with  each  trip)  EVs 
consume locally  produced electricity  with 
each  trip and additional  lithium  is only 
required when  the battery  is replaced or  a 
new  vehicle is purchased.  To put this in 
perspective, consider  the difference between 
events that squeeze the supply  of oil and 
those that  would squeeze the supply  of 
lithium. A  shutoff of oil  has an  almost 
i m m e d i a t e d e l e t e r i o u s e f f e c t  o n 
transportation.  A  squeeze on  the supply  of 
lithium  means that  fewer  new  batteries can 
be produced. The batteries in  existence will 
continue to function.  Over  a  period of weeks 
or  months a  lessening  in  the efficiency  of 
vehicles may  be seen, but there will  not  be a 
fundamental disruption  of the transportation 
sector.
There are also other  potential sources of 
lithium.  The Institute of Ocean  Energy  at 
Saga University  in  Japan has described the 
research  being  conducted by  Japan  and 
South  Korea  to enable harvesting  of the 230 
billion  tons of lithium  present in seawater. 84 
Similarly, lithium  may  not  be the one and 
only  source of energy  for EV  batteries.  The 
history  of the EV battery  shows a progression 
every  few  years to a  different  source material, 
from  lead acid to nickel metal hydride and 
now  to lithium-ion. 85  Development  is 
constantly  progressing  on  a  variety  of 
alternatives like aluminum  air  batteries. 
Some research  has shown  reason to believe 
that  metal air  batteries – where the cathode 
of the battery  is air  – could provide up to 
eleven  times the energy  density  of the best 
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lithium-ion batteries currently  available. 86 
Variety  should be strongly  encouraged, with 
appropriate nudges to help orient  the 
market’s focus towards resources available 
within the United States. 87
WHY NOT NATURAL GAS?
Proponents of natural  gas have touted it as 
the best  alternate method of powering 
vehicles.  There are a  number of factors that 
make natural  gas less appealing, at  least at 
this point  in time,  than  electric  vehicles.  First, 
to achieve equivalency  to the range of today’s 
gasoline powered vehicle, the natural gas 
must  be in a  liquefied form.  The technical 
c o m p l i c a t i o n s o f u s i n g a n d w i d e l y 
distributing  liquefied natural  gas at refueling 
stations has roughly  the same challenges as 
establishing a  recharge infrastructure for 
electric vehicles.  Except, of course, that home 
charging  an  electric vehicle overnight  is no 
more complicated than  plugging  in  a 
household dryer, so in  effect a  portion  of the 
recharge infrastructure is already in place.  
Second, using natural  gas as the direct 
source  to power  vehicles locks the country 
into a  single source replacement for  oil. 
Though  estimates suggest  America’s natural 
gas resources are quite large,  it does not 
make sense to create an infrastructure that 
limits the country’s flexibility, and not all 
estimates describe such  robust stores.88 What 
if estimates are wrong? What  if the difficulty 
of extracting  the natural gas proves greater 
than  currently  believed? What  if the 
environmental affects are so ruinous that  the 
country  rejects some forms of extraction? 
What  if we simply  run  out  of this non-
renewable source? Electric  vehicles are a  far 
more flexible option.  The electricity  to charge 
the batteries can  come from  any  source of 
domestically  supplied energy  and still yield 
energy  independence. If natural gas supplies 
are as bountiful and available as currently 
thought, natural gas could fuel the power 
plants that  charge the electric vehicles.  The 
great  flexibility  of the electric vehicle is that  it 
can  just as readily  incorporate energy  from 
coal,  solar  power, wind or  any  other  source or 
combination of sources of energy.
FUNGIBLE NATURE OF THE OIL MARKET
Oil is part  of a fungible world market.89 That 
means that reducing oil  to levels where the 
United States is capable of providing all its 
petroleum  needs does not  necessarily  mean 
that  the oil used in  the United States will  be 
100 percent  domestically  produced. As it 
stands currently,  the United States exports 
two million  barrels of oil per  day. 90  As US 
demand decreases with the roll  out  of EVs, 
the United States may  begin to export  more 
of its oil. As a  fungible product, domestic oil 
prices will  not necessarily  be protected from 
the effects of international  disruption  of oil 
supplies. However, if the United States is 
c a p a b l e o f s u p p l y i n g  i t s o w n  o i l 
requirements, then with proper  planning it 
can  ensure a  relatively  uninterrupted supply 
of oil regardless of international supply 
disruptions.  
For  example, in  considering  what  first 
responders can  do to offset  the impact on 
their  operational capabilities in  the event of 
localized fuel  shortages, it  has been  suggested 
that  they  should enter  into firm  contracts for 
fuel.91  At present, firm  contracts would not 
solve the problem  for  the country  as a  whole. 
If the world supply  were disrupted,  domestic 
sources could not fulfill  the contracts, 
because there simply  would not be  enough 
fuel to go around. However,  once energy 
independence is achieved,  firm  contracts with 
domestic suppliers could all  be fulfilled. 
Those portions of the government  or  private 
sector  that  wish  to hedge against  supply 
disruptions could enter  into futures contracts 
or  other  contractual  arrangements to ensure 
a given supply at a given price.
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
A REGRESSIVE EXCISE TAX
A  tax is regressive when  it  causes lower-
income families to pay  a higher  percentage of 
their  income to the tax than  higher-income 
families.92 By  adding a cost-per-gallon  tax  on 
gasoline,  the financial effects would have a 
disproportionate impact  on  lower-income 
families. A  simple way  to lessen  the impact 
would be in  the form  of a  tax  credit  that  is 
phased out over  a  particular  income level. To 
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avoid bureaucratic expenses, a national or 
regional  average of both  the price of gasoline 
and of the average gallons consumed can be 
used.  The credit will not  precisely  match the 
expense incurred,  but can be sufficiently 
harmonized to minimize the harm  to lower-
income families.
For  example, in  2009, there were 8.8 
million families living below  the poverty  line. 
For  an  idea  of what  that  measures,  for  a 
family  of four made up of two adults and two 
children  the poverty  line was $21,756.93 For 
purposes of this example,  assume that each  of 
those families had one vehicle.  As explained 
in  Appendix  3, the average driver  uses 490 
gallons of gasoline a  year.  Assuming 
policymakers felt that  all  families below  the 
poverty  line should receive a  rebate, then  in  a 
year  where the gasoline excise tax  was two 
dollars, 8.8 million  families would receive a 
rebate of $980. That  would be a  total  rebate 
to those families of $8.624  billion.  If the 
rebate was phased out  incrementally  for 
families above the poverty  line, even 
assuming  another  $8.624  billion was 
returned to those families, Table 2  shows that 
there would still be $13.3  billion  left to use to 
promote recharge infrastructure growth 
($30.55  billion  left  after  EV  rebates,  minus 
$8.624 billion times two).
RISK OF INCREASING COST OF GOODS / 
INFLATION
Recent  gasoline price increases have caused a 
corresponding  increase in the cost  of goods, 
and may  diminish  consumers’ savings.94 
Rising  gasoline prices can  contribute to 
higher  transportation costs,  thereby  raising 
expenses at  all stages of production. 95 The 
course  of action proposed herein  minimizes 
that  threat  to an  extent. In  the first instance, 
the excise fee is only  levied on  motor  fuel. 
This does not  include diesel  fuel,  the form  of 
oil used by  the semi-trailer  trucks that 
transport  much  of the goods across the 
nation. In  2009, in  the United States, there 
was approximately  16,878,000  gallons of 
diesel fuel sold per  day,96  compared to 
approximately  49,798,000  gallons of retail 
u n l e a d e d g a s o l i n e s o l d p e r  d a y . 97 
Furthermore,  the 49,798,000 gallons of retail 
gasoline subject to the excise  tax  is only  about 
one sixth  of the motor  gasoline sales each 
day.  The other categories of motor  gasoline 
sold each  day  are DTW,  rack,  and bulk. 98 
Therefore,  governments and businesses that 
obtain  their gasoline in bulk would not be 
subject  to the excise tax  under  the 
implementation proposed herein. Since the 
price increase will  not be on  oil  in  general, 
but  on  a subset  with  less impact  on 
commerce dependent  on oil,  the forces that 
would otherwise push  the price of goods 
higher are diminished.
SIGNIFICANT DROP IN THE PRICE OF OIL
A  switch from  vehicles using motor  gasoline 
to EVs may  also be a  victim  of its own 
success.  With  sufficient numbers of EVs on 
the roads,  the demand for  gasoline will take a 
measurable decline.  Should a  significant 
number  of other  nations follow  a  similar 
course,  the worldwide demand for  gasoline 
may  drop significantly,  thereby  reducing  the 
price of oil. As the price of oil and therefore 
gasoline drops,  the effect of the program  may 
also decline.  Determining  an  appropriate 
f loor  for  the price  of gasol ine and 
automatically  increasing  the excise fee to 
maintain that floor could remedy this effect.
CONCLUSION
For  forty  years, every  president of the United 
States has proclaimed the critical importance 
of energy  independence. Time and again, the 
chains of foreign  oil  have shackled the 
decisions of American  officials; yet,  nothing 
has been  done.  No pragmatic,  realistic  step-
by-step plan has been  pursued to end this 
burden  on the American people. America  can 
break  free of those artificially  imposed 
restraints.  There is a  cost  to achieving  energy 
independence,  and as shown  herein, that  cost 
is two to five dollars on  each  gallon  of retail 
gasoline sold. 
Two to five dollars per  gallon  of gasoline 
will bolster  the nation’s critical infrastructure 
by  expanding and upgrading the production 
and transmission of electricity.  Two to five 
dollars per  gallon  of gasoline will bring an 
end to funding  the very  terrorists we then 
spend billions trying to defeat. Two to five 
dollars per  gallon  of gasoline will bring an 
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end to tortured national policy  decisions and 
the otherwise nonsensical strategic military 
decisions.  With  conviction,  determination, 
and selfless leadership – and two to five 
dollars per  gallon  of gasoline – the United 
States can  achieve energy  independence in  a 
few short years.
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Appendix 1 – Premise and Development of the Model
PREMISE
The model developed by  Jeihani and Sibdari provides the conceptual basis for development 
of a  predictive model. 99  They  utilize a  binary  vehicle choice model  in  order  to provide a 
quantitative framework  to assess the various factors that  might  influence consumer  transition 
choices.  In  their  work, the relative probability, P,  of choosing one type of car, denoted by  the 
subscript  e, to another  type of car, denoted by  the subscript c,  for  any  given  household, i,  is 
captured by the following formula:
 (4)
Where A,  B,  and C are constants, K represents the characteristics of the buyer, and L 
represents the characteristics of the car.  The constant A  in Equation  4  can be related to the type 
of car  that, in  effect,  represents a  bias that  a  consumer  might have towards a  vehicle.  For 
instance,  range anxiety  might  well make a  consumer  wary  of an  EV  and this may  be captured in 
the constant A,  driving  down  the probability  of choosing an  electric  car. Likewise,  styling,  or  fuel 
economy might well have an influence, as could environmental considerations.
The constant B weights the characteristics of the buyer  towards certain  car  types,  while the 
constant C weights the vehicle characteristics.
The constant  Ki captures household characteristics including both  employment  status and 
income while L captures the initial vehicle cost and the cost per mile for vehicle locomotion. 
Though  Jeihani and Sibdari  used only  one standalone constant,  A,  one could imagine 
including a  great  many  such constants in  an attempt  to capture a  greater  range of consumer 
biases.  One could imagine developing an input to the car  characteristics that  would include a 
national defense cost  per  vehicle, where that cost  reflects the investment  made by  the DoD to 
maintain  shipping  lanes, providing  support  to governments that are critical for  oil imports,  etc. 
Those costs would then  appear  as a  price per  vehicle, which could be denoted as a  national 
defense cost,  ND,  that  is weighted by  the fuel efficiency  of a  particular  vehicle.  Likewise, one 
could attempt  to capture the economic costs of the oil trade deficit  to the nation,  the 
approximately  one billion  dollar  daily  deficit. Those costs could also appear  as a  price per  vehicle 
and, denoted as a trade imbalance cost, TI, would also be weighted by a vehicle’s fuel efficiency.
Notably, Jeihani  and Sibdari did not adjust  for  inflation when analyzing  historical data  they 
collected.  Adjusting  the historical data  used herein  was considered; however,  the model is 
designed to reflect  people’s choices at a  fixed point in  time.  When  consumers go to purchase a 
vehicle  they  are considering  what  the price of gasoline currently  is,  what their  income currently 
is,  etc.  They  may  also be considering  what  they  expect the value of those items to be in the 
future,  but  they  are concerned with  absolute amounts. The model  shows fixed choices from 
moment to moment.   If high levels of inflation  were anticipated going forward,  that could 
influence consumer  purchasing  decisions in general (e.g., buy  assets rather than  hold onto 
money),  but none of the purchase periods analyzed in  this paper took place during periods 
where inflation  was particularly  high.   From  1991  through  2010, no calendar  year  saw  inflation 
greater  than  4.2  percent.100  In  fact, adjusting  for  inflation  would flatten  the changes in  the 
economic  data. Rather  than  reflecting  reality,  it  would actually  skew  the reality  that the 
consumer faced at the time of their purchase decision. 
STEIN, ENERGY INDEPENDENCE  18
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 9, ARTICLE 4 (FEBRUARY 2013) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
DEVELOPMENT OF PREDICTIVE MODEL
Assuming  a  linear relationship between  the change in  the number  of hybrid vehicles sold in 
any  year,  ΔShy,  and any  of the influencing  parameters,  as was the basis for  the Jehani and 
Sibdari model,  the number  of hybrid vehicles sold in  any  year, Shy,  can  be modeled and the 
model be used to project  future sales.  Future sales depends on  many  economic and perception 
factors. Among  the national economic parameters the Jehani and Sibdari model  included were: 
the median  household income I,  in the modeled year, the unemployment  level U,  and the price 
of gasoline G.  For  the vehicular  economic parameters the model included the gas mileage, Mhy, 
as represented by  the number  of miles the vehicle can  travel per  gallon of gasoline and the 
hybrid vehicle price Phy.  Finally,  all parameters associated with  customer  perception  such  as 
comfort, reliability,  social appearance,  environmental  stewardship, etc.  were lumped into a 
single coefficient  Ahy.  In  essence, the coefficient represents the total combination  of factors the 
consumer is considering that have not been specifically accounted for elsewhere in the equation.
One way  to look  at  the effect  of policy  choices is by  examining  the fraction of new  sales, 
ΔSannual,  in  any  year relative to the total sales Sannual.  This fraction  is the sales strain, and is 
represented by:
 (5)
A  linear  relationship between  the sales strain  and any  influencing  parameter  is the simplest 
approach  to modeling  the sales figures.  For  example,  the effect of household income,  I,  on the 
sales strain  of hybrid vehicles when  isolated from  other  parameters that influence sales,  would 
be:
 (6)
Where ΔSIhy  is the change in  the sales figures of hybrid vehicles due to the change in 
household income.  As the overall sales figure  Shy increases so does the change in  that  figure due 
changes in  any  parameter  such as I. The fundamental  assumption  in  Equation   (6) is that  ΔSIhy 
varies linearly  both  with  I and Shy. The coefficient  Bhy is a proportionality  factor to be derived 
empirically using historic data.   
Dependences similar  to Equation 6  for the effects of U, CPMhy and Phy on  the sales figures 
can  be derived to provide ΔSUhy,  ΔSCPMhyhy and ΔSPhyhy, which  are the change in the sales figures 
when  each  of the representative parameters is isolated from  the others.   The proportionality 
coefficients to be assigned to these dependences are Chy, Dhy and Ehy respectively.  All three 
coefficients need to be determined empirically using historic data.  
The combined effect  of all  these parameters on the annual sales figures of hybrid vehicles can 
be obtained by superposition or a simple addition:
  (7)
Where Δt is the period over  which  sales occur.  Since this model looks only  at  year-over-year 
sales,  Δt=1  and can  be dropped for  simplicity  from  future derivations.  Equation  7  can now  be 
integrated for Shy, then  adding Ahy,  the integration  coefficient,  which  is described above, to 
provide:
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 (8)
Notably, this approach  results in  an exponential relationship between  sales volume and 
income,  unemployment, fuel  costs and purchase price.  Taking  the natural  log of this equation 
yields:
 (1)
Note that  Equation  1  is the immediate result  of the integration of Equation  7.  However, 
Equation  8 was shown  first  to show  the relationship between  this derivation and the model 
presented by  Jehani and Sibdari.  This expresses the relationship between  the various 
parameters that  are likely  to influence the sales volume and the sales volume itself.  Actual 
numerical values can  be determined after  obtaining the values of the coefficients Bhy,  Chy,  Dhy 
and Ehy, with an  offset factor  given by  Ahy.  To derive the five empirical coefficients of Equation 
(1),  one needs to obtain  historical  data  concerning  household income, unemployment,  price of 
gasoline,  gas mileage and car prices for  at least  five years.  To the extent  data  is available, a 
similar equation can be derived for each vehicle model or model group.  
In  order  to check  the methodology  against  a  more traditional  vehicle class,  a  similar  process 
was undertaken  for  the SUV  class of vehicles.   The equation representing  the sales figures of 
SUV vehicles was derived similarly to Equation (1) to yield:    
 (2)
Again, the coefficients ASUV,  BSUV,  CSUV, DSUV,  and ESUV are  empirical coefficients. Similar  to 
those of the hybrid vehicle, they are to be derived using at least five years of historical data.  
Unlike SUVs and hybrid vehicles, the available historic data  on  the sales volume of EVs is 
inconsistent with extremely  small numbers.  Consequently,  those figures were not  considered 
reliable for  the purpose of projecting  future sales of EVs and the potential response to market-
changing  policies.   Instead,  the coefficients derived for  the hybrid vehicle  using historical data 
were retained as proxies for  the EV sales volume model.  It  is reasonable to presume that  factors 
influencing people’s decision to purchase hybrid vehicles will similarly  influence their  decision 
to purchase EVs.  As with  hybrids,  it  is likely  that  the first  consumers to purchase EVs do so for  a 
myriad of concerns (e.g.,  environmental, status). As sales of hybrids grew,  economic forces such 
as declining  vehicle price  and increase in  gasoline would have become the dominant  market 
drivers.  The same is presumed to be true with  EVs. Therefore, only  one parameter  from  the 
hybrid model Equation  1  was replaced.   CPMhy was replaced with  PMEV,  which  was derived using 
the representative cost  of electricity  per  kWhr and the number of miles driven by  the EV per 
kWhr.  Accordingly, the model describing the sales volume of electric vehicle is represented by:
 (3)
As previously explained:
• Ahy = all consumer  preferences and choice factors not  specifically  addressed elsewhere 
in the equation,
• SEV = the sales volume of electric vehicles, 
• Bhy = weight factor for societal annual income, 
• I = societal average annual income,
• Chy = weight factor for unemployment,
• U = total unemployment, 
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• Dhy = cost of locomotion factor,
• PMEV = price per mile for locomotion,
• Ehy = weight factor for price of hybrid,
• PEV = price of hybrid vehicle
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Appendix 2 – Deriving the Constants with Historical Data
To derive the five empirical coefficients of Equation  1, Ahy. Bhy, Chy,  Dhy and Ehy,  it  is 
necessary  to obtain historical data  concerning  household income,  unemployment, price of 
gasoline,  gas mileage, and car  prices for  at least five years.  To the extent  data  is available, a 
similar  equation  can  be derived for  each vehicle  model or  model group.  More than  five years of 
data  was available for each  vehicle group. With  only  five years available,  the five coefficients of 
each  model (Equations 1  and 2) could be determined by  solving five algebraic equations. With 
additional years available,  the coefficients could be determined by  fitting ln(Shy)  and ln(SSUV),  as 
determined by  Equations 1  and 2  respectively,  to the sales volumes as shown  in  Table 3, through 
adjustment of the coefficients of these equations until the overlap between the historic data  and 
the analytic data is optimized.
Historical Data for SUVs and Hybrid Vehicles





in US$ *1 $/gallon *2 *3 *4 *5 in US$ *6 in US$*7 *8 *9
‘91 30,126 1.10 1,095,000 8,628,000 15,747 16
‘92 30,636 1.09 1,003,000 9,613,000 16,692 16
‘93 31,241 1.07 1,311,000 8,940,000 17,550 17
‘94 32,264 1.07 1,623,000 7,996,000 18,860 16
‘95 34,076 1.10 1,816,000 7,404,000 22,305 16
‘96 35,492 1.19 1,890,000 7,236,000 21,170 16
‘97 37,005 1.19 2,450,000 6,739,000 21,485 16
‘98 38,885 1.02 2,581,000 6,210,000 21,560 16
‘99 40,696 1.12 2,831,000 5,880,000 22,070 16
’00 41,990 1.46 3,143,000 9,350 5,692,000 23,480 19,995 41 16
’01 42,228 1.38 3,450,000 20,282 6,801,000 25,210 19,995 41 17
’02 42,409 1.31 4,191,000 36,035 8,378,000 24,585 19,995 41 16
’03 43,318 1.52 4,118,000 47,600 8,774,000 26,285 19,995 41 15
’04 44,334 1.81 4,713,000 84,199 8,149,000 26,600 20,295 46 15
’05 46,326 2.24 4,084,000 209,711 7,591,000 27,165 21,275 46 16
’06 48,201 2.53 3,757,000 252,636 7,001,000 26,530 16,213* 46 16
’07 50,233 2.70 4,231,000 352,274 7,078,000 25,370 20,601* 46 16
’08 50,303 3.26 3,987,000 312,386 8,924,000 26,495 21,500 46 16
’09 49,777 2.36 2,296,000 290,271 14,265,000 28,470 22,000 46 16
’10 50,000 2.79 3,000,000 274,210 14,825,000 29,280 22,800 50 17
* Includes weighted average of rebate that was offered during some or all of the year.*10
*1 US Census Bureau, Median Household Income by State: 1984 to 2009, 
 http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/H08_2009.xls
 (only applicable to years 1991–2009. Year 2010 is an estimate).
*2 Jeihani and Sibdari, “The Impact of Gas Price Trends;” EIA, Data I: All Grades Conventional EIA,
 http://www.eia.gov/oog/ftparea/wogirs/xls/pswrgvwag.xls 
*3 US Department of Energy, www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/data/docs/ldv_sales.xls (only applicable to years 
 1991–2009. Year 2010 is an estimate).
*4 U.S. Department of Energy, http://www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/data/vehicles.html#afv_hev
*5 Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat1.pdf 
*6 Retrieved from www.autotrader.com
*7 2002, 2003, 2005, 2011 retrieved from www.epionions.com/specs/auto
 2004 retrieved from http://consumerguideauto.howstuffworks.com
 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 retrieved from www.web2carz.com/toyota/prius
*8 Retrieved from http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/findacar.htm
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*9 Retrieved from http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/findacar.htm
*10 Information to perform weighted average for rebate: http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/tax_hybride.shtml
Figures 4  and 5  graphically  represent  the outcome of the optimal fit between the actual  sales 
figures and the modeled figures. Optimization  was achieved by  minimization of the root mean 
square of the differences between  actual  and modeled figures.  Table 1  shows the coefficients of 
the two models as derived through this analysis.
Figures 4  and 5  show  that, after  optimization  of the coefficient, Equations 1  and 2  yielded 
generally good approximations of the actual sales data.  
Figure 4. Comparison of the Variation of ln(Shy) with Year of Sale as Derived by Model (blue) with 
Historic Data (red)
Figure 5. Comparison of the Variation of ln(SSUV) with Year of Sale as Derived by Model (blue) with 
Historic Data (red)
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Although  the match between the actual  and modeled sales volume is good, its application  is 
limited.  One should note that the two models (Equations 1  and 2) are independent  of each  other 
(i.e.,  as modeled,  the sales of one group does not  affect the sales of the other  group (non-
cannibalization)).  Such  independence is justified when the sales volume of hybrids or EVs is 
small relative to the total  vehicle market; however, when the sales of one group overwhelm  the 
market,  the model must be reexamined. This failure of the model  would occur at  some point  as 
the market  responds so favorably  to government  policies that  the use of internal combustion 
engines is almost completely  abandoned in  favor  of EVs. Lacking  a  detailed analysis of the 
points of failure, it  is assumed herein that the model should be used primarily  as the predictor  of 
trends (i.e.,  significant increase or  decrease in  the sales of certain  vehicle groups,  rather  than the 
predictor of actual sales volumes).  
Table 1. Coefficients of the Sales Volume Models (Eqns. 1 and 2) of Hybrid and SUV Vehicles as Derived 
by Fitting These Equations to Historical Sales Data
A B C D E
Hybrid/electric 3.6 2.16*10–4 -1*10–13 31.1 -1.66*10–4
SUV 13.36 2.01*10–4 -1.4*10–7 -10.8 -1.97*10–4
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Appendix 3 – Future Assumptions Used To Predict EV Sales
1.  The gasoline excise  tax  is $2  per gallon  in  2012,  $4  the following year, and $5  in  2014  through 
2018. 
2. The EV  price for  2011  uses the Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price (MSRP) of the entry-
level 2012  model year  Nissan  Leaf,  $35,200  (Nissan) and a  three percent annual  decrease in 
price thereafter.101  The expected MSRP does not  include the government subsidy  described 
below.  This decrease is a  conservative number  considering  the anticipated rapid change in 
volume,  which will create economies of scale.   However, this reflects a  similar  conservative 
determination  made by  Brooker,  that the price of EV  batteries will  decrease by  three percent per 
year. 102
3. Though  soon  after  publication  of this work,  actual 2011  sales volumes may  be available for 
EVs, the 2011  sales volume used here was obtained from  the predictive model.  The 2010 EV 
sales were estimated as 10 percent of the hybrid vehicles sales volume of 274,210. 103
4. The 2011  total  sales cost of the EV  reduces the MSRP described above by  the $7,500  tax 
rebate that has historically  been  available for  purchase of an  all-electric  vehicle.  Beginning  in 
2012  and thereafter,  the total cost  of the EV  begins with  the MSRP price described above and 
reduces it by $15,000, the amount of tax rebate used for this particular predictive analysis.
5.  Beginning in 2008  with  an EV cost  per  mile  of three cents,104  the model  assumes a  three 
percent  annual increase in  the price per  mile for  the EV.  This presumes the cost  of electricity 
will increase with  increased demand,  though this could be offset  if batteries become more 
efficient at recharging or otherwise become more efficient.
6. Gallons of gas sold per  year  begins with  the actual gallons sold at  retail in  2009, 
18,176,124,000 gallons,105 leaves the amount  constant  for  2010 and 2011, and assumes a  five 
percent  decrease in  2012, the first year  a  gasoline tax is imposed in this model.  The five percent 
decrease assumes that  imposition  of the two-dollar  tax will induce a  decrease in  the demand for 
gasoline.  Each  year  beyond 2012, the decrease in  gasoline sales is determined by  multiplying  the 
number  of EVs sold the prior  year by  490 gallons.  The average driver drives 13,476  miles per 
year. 106  Current CAFE standards provide for  an  average vehicle gas mileage of 27.5  mpg.107 
Dividing average miles driven per  year  by  average gas mileage provides an  estimate of the 
gallons of gasoline used by  each  vehicle per  year.  Assuming  that each  EV  sold the previous year 
will reduce sales of gasoline-powered vehicles by  one that equates to 490 fewer  gallons of 
gasoline sold in  the current  year for  each EV  sold the prior  year. In  fact, the decrease is likely 
higher  due to drivers who purchase EVs throughout the year  and other  factors,  but  this is the 
estimate used in  the model.  A  further  benefit  of this assumption  is that  it  indirectly  introduces a 
coupling between  the sales volume of EVs and sales of other  vehicles. It  assumes that  sales of 
EVs will cannibalize sales of all other  vehicles; however,  this is an incomplete and very  partial 
coupling that does not overcome the weakness of the model as indicated above.
7.  The unemployment factor  begins in  2010 with  the published total unemployment  figure of 
14,825,000, 108 and assumes a one percent reduction each year.
8.  The income factor  uses the 2009  median  annual income of $49,777,109  and assumes a  one 
percent increase each year.
9. The base price of gasoline,  prior  to the introduction  of the excise tax, begins with  an  average 
price of three dollars per  gallon  in  2011  and increases the price by  five percent per  year. That 
assumes that  the world oil  market  will  continue to see an increase in  demand even  as demand 
in the United States declines.
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